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Life sentence penalty covers a diverse range of practices, 
from the most severe form of life imprisonment without 
parole, in which a person is sentenced to die in prison so long 
as their sentence stands, to more indeterminate sentences in 
which at the time of sentencing it is not clear how long the 
sentenced person will spend in prison. Dealing with the 
question whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state 
where is accused of a crime for which a sentence of life 
imprisonment can be imposed can potentially violate article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
What all these sentences have in common, however, is that 
at the time the sentence is passed, a person is liable to be 
detained for the rest of his or her natural life. We all know “The 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules” and relevant 
international instruments on the rehabilitation of 
imprisonment, but at the moment more than 73 States in the 
world retain life imprisonment as a penalty for offences 
committed while under the age of 18. General perspective of 
criminal justice reform in Latin America should take into a 
right account the meaning of life - imprisonment penalty under 
article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
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1. The point of Law  
 
In case law of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom1 the compliant 
claim alleged violation of article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. 
Before the Grand Chamber, the applicants maintained their complaints 
that their whole life orders were incompatible with Article 3 of the 
Convention, which provides as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”2 
 
2.  Introduction  
 
Since the abolition of the death penalty in England and Wales, the 
sentence for murder has been a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. 
Currently, when such a sentence is imposed, the trial judge is required to 
set a minimum term of imprisonment, which must be served for the 
purposes of punishment and retribution, taking into account the 
seriousness of the offence. The principles which guide the trial judge’s 
assessment of the appropriate minimum term are set out in schedule 21 to 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Once the minimum term has been served, the 
prisoner may apply to the Parole Board for release on licence. 
Exceptionally, however, “a whole life order” may be imposed by the trial 
judge instead of a minimum term if, applying the principles set out in 
schedule 21, he or she considers that the seriousness of the offence is 
exceptionally high.  
This case concerns three applicants who, having been convicted of 
murder in separate criminal proceedings in England and Wales, are 
currently serving mandatory sentences of life imprisonment. All three 
applicants have been given whole life orders: in the first applicant’s case 
this order was made by the trial judge under the current sentencing 
                                                 
1ECHR, Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 9 July 
2013. 
2 M. ANTINUCCI, Internal and international corruption, in Iliria International Review, 2015 – 1, 
Prishtine (Albania). 
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provisions; in the case of the second and third applicants, who were 
convicted and sentenced prior to the entry into force of the 2003 Act, the 
orders were made by the High Court. All three applicants maintain that 
these whole life orders, as they apply to their cases, are incompatible inter 
alia with Articles 3 and 5 § 4 of the Convention3.   
 
2. Extradition of terrorism suspects 
 
On the 4th of September 2014, the European Court of Human Rights 
handed down its judgment in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium4. Ending a 
decade-long debate the Court ruled that Belgium’s extradition of terrorist 
suspect Nizar Trabelsi to the United States is a violation of art.3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). In the Court’s view, the 
prospect of receiving a life sentence without parole constituted prohibited 
inhuman treatment. This case is built on earlier cases on extradition to non-
Convention Parties and raises contentious questions regarding the scope of 
art.3 ECHR and the balance between the fight against terrorism and human 
rights. 
In spite of Trabelsi having already been extradited, in the merits phase 
the Court was still to rule on the compatibility of the extradition with art. 3 
ECHR in light of the potential life sentence. This was the first time the 
Court was called on to pronounce itself on this legal question. That being 
said, in two earlier cases, the Court had addressed the permissibility of 
whole-life sentences outside an extradition context. In Kafkaris v. Cyprus5, the 
Court held that such sentences are prohibited by art. 3 where it could be 
shown that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime 
committed, that the applicant’s continued imprisonment could no longer be 
justified on legitimate penological grounds or that the sentence was de 
facto (in practice) or de jure (by law) irreducible (Kafkaris v. Cyprus). 
The Court confirmed these principles in Vinter and Others v UK and 
added that a whole-life prisoner was entitled to know, at the outset of his 
sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and under what 
conditions, including when a review of his sentence takes place or could be 
sought (Vinter and Others v. UK). 
 
                                                 
3 M. ANTINUCCI, La libertà dell’estradando nel regime cautelare d’urgenza, in Giur. it., 2013, 3. 
4 ECHR, Trabelsi v. Belgium, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 4 of September.  
5 ECHR, Kafkaris v. Cyprus, (Grand Chamber) of 12 of february 2008. 
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3. Council of Europe texts  
 
A report on “Actual/Real Life Sentences”, prepared by a member of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”), reviewed various Council of 
Europe texts on life sentences, including recommendations (2003) 22 and 
23, and stated in terms that:  
(a) the principle of making conditional release available is relevant to 
all prisoners, “even to life prisoners”; 
 (b) that all Council of Europe member States had provision for 
compassionate release but that this “special form of release” was 
distinct from conditional release.  
 
The CPT considers therefore that it is inhuman to imprison someone for 
life without any real hope of release. The Committee strongly urges 
authorities to re-examine the concept of detention "for life" accordingly.”6. 
 
4. International criminal law  
 
Article 77 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court allows 
for the imposition of a term of life imprisonment when justified by the 
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person. Article 110 provides that when a person has served 
twenty-five years of a sentence of life imprisonment, the Court shall review 
the sentence to determine whether it should be reduced. Such a review 
shall not be conducted before that time7. For example in the case Harkins 
and Edwards v. the United Kingdom8  both applicants faced extradition 
from the United Kingdom to the United States where, they alleged, they 
risked the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole. The US 
authorities provided assurances that the death penalty would not be 
                                                 
6 A. GAITO, Mandato d'arresto europeo ed estradizione, in Procedura penale, Torino, 2012, 920. ID., 
La vigenza del principio di specialità (a proposito del mandato d’arresto europeo ed estradizione), in 
Giur. It., 2004, 7.  
7 For a general perspective, M. ANTINUCCI, The new Public Procurement Code within 
international relations and anti-corruption policies, Vestnik of Saint-Petersburg University. 
Series 14 Law, Issue n. 3, 2016.    
8ECHR, Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom, judgement (Grand Chambre) of 
17.01.2012. 
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applied in their cases and that the maximum sentence they risked was life 
imprisonment. Regarding the risk of life imprisonment without parole, the 
Court held that there would be no violation of Article 3 (prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention if one or the other 
applicant was extradited to the United States, finding that neither applicant 
had demonstrated that there would be a real risk of treatment reaching the 
Article 3 threshold as a result of his sentence. In the first applicant’s case, 
the Court was not persuaded that it would be grossly disproportionate for 
him to be given a mandatory life sentence in the United States. He had been 
over 18 at the time of his alleged crime, had not been diagnosed with a 
psychiatric disorder, and the killing had been part of an armed robbery 
attempt – an aggravating factor. Further, he had not yet been convicted, 
and – even if he were convicted and given a mandatory life sentence – 
keeping him in prison might continue to be justified throughout his life 
time. And if that were not the case, the Governor of Florida and the Florida 
Board of Executive Clemency could, in principle, decide to reduce his 
sentence. As regards the second applicant, he faced – at most – a 
discretionary life sentence without parole. Given that it could only be 
imposed after consideration by the trial judge of all relevant factors and 
only if he were convicted for a pre-meditated murder, the Court concluded 
that such a sentence would not be grossly disproportionate.  
 
5. Life sentences in the Contracting States 
 
On the basis of the comparative materials before the Court, following 
practices in the Contracting States may be observed.  
First, there are currently nine countries where life imprisonment does 
not exist: Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, 
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia and Spain. The maximum term of 
imprisonment in these countries ranges from twenty-one years in Norway 
to forty-five years in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Croatia in a case of 
cumulative offences, a fifty-year sentence can be imposed. Second, in the 
majority of countries where a sentence of life imprisonment may be 
imposed, there exists a dedicated mechanism for reviewing the sentence 
after the prisoner has served a certain minimum period fixed by law. Such 
a mechanism, integrated within the law and practice on sentencing, is 
foreseen in the law of thirty-two countries: Albania (25 years), Armenia 
(20), Austria (15), Azerbaijan (25), Belgium (15 with an extension to 19 or 23 
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years for recidivists), Bulgaria (20), Cyprus (12), Czech Republic (20), 
Denmark (12), Estonia (30), Finland (12), France (normally 18 but 30 years 
for certain murders), Georgia (25), Germany (15), Greece (20), Hungary (20 
unless the court orders otherwise), Ireland (an initial review by the Parole 
Board after 7 years except for certain types of murders), Italy9 (26), Latvia 
(25), Liechtenstein (15), Luxembourg (15), Moldova (30), Monaco (15), 
Poland (25), Romania (20), Russia (25), Slovakia (25), Slovenia (25), Sweden 
(10), Switzerland (15 years reducible to 10 years), the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (15), and Turkey (24 years, 30 for aggravated life 
imprisonment and 36 for aggregate sentences of aggravated life 
imprisonment). In respect of the United Kingdom, the Court notes that, in 
Scotland, when passing a life sentence, a judge is required to set a 
minimum term, notwithstanding the likelihood that such a period will 
exceed the remainder of the prisoner’s natural life: see the Convention 
Rights (Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001. Third, there are five countries 
which make no provision for parole for life prisoners: Iceland, Lithuania, 
Malta, the Netherlands and Ukraine. These countries do, however, allow 
life prisoners to apply for commutation of life sentences by means of 
ministerial, presidential or royal pardon. In Iceland, although it is still 
available as a sentence, life imprisonment has never been imposed. 
 
6. General conclusion in respect of life sentences  
 
The Court considers that, in the context of a life-sentence, Article 3 must 
be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a 
review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any 
changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards 
rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that 
continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological 
grounds.  However, the Court would emphasise that, having regard to the 
margin of appreciation which must be accorded to Contracting States in the 
matters of criminal justice and sentencing, it is not its task to prescribe the 
form (executive or judicial) which that review should take. For the same 
reason, it is not for the Court to determine when that review should take 
place. This being said, the Court would also observe that the comparative 
                                                 
9 M. ANTINUCCI, The principles of patrimony due process of law: the punitive confiscation and the 
protection of third parties misrelated to the crime, in Iliria International Review, 2015 – 2, 
Prishtine (Albania). 
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and international law materials before it show clear support for the 
institution of a dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later than 
twenty-five years after the imposition of a life sentence, with further 
periodic reviews thereafter.  
That it follows from this conclusion that, where domestic law does not 
provide for the possibility of such a review, a whole life sentence will not 
measure up to the standards of Article 3 of the Convention10.  
Although the requisite review is a prospective event necessarily 
subsequent to the passing of the sentence, a whole life prisoner should not 
be obliged to wait and serve an indeterminate number of years of his 
sentence before he can raise the complaint that the legal conditions 
attaching to his sentence fail to comply with the requirements of Article 3 in 
this regard. This would be contrary both to legal certainty and to the 
general principles on victim status within the meaning of that term in 
Article 34 of the Convention. Furthermore, in cases where the sentence, on 
imposition, is irreducible under domestic law, it would be capricious to 
expect the prisoner to work towards his own rehabilitation without 
knowing whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be 
introduced which would allow him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be 
considered for release. A whole life prisoner is entitled to know, at the 
outset of his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and 
under what conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take 
place or may be sought. Consequently, where domestic law does not 
provide any mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence, 
the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the 
moment of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage 
of incarceration. 
 
7. Concurring opinion of Judge Power-Forde 
 
“I voted with the majority in this case and wish to add the following. I 
understand and share many of the views expressed by Judge Villiger in his 
partly dissenting opinion. However, what tipped the balance for me in 
voting with the majority was the Court’s confirmation, in this judgment, 
that Article 3 encompasses what might be described as “the right to hope” . It 
                                                 
10 G. RANALDI, Il procedimento di estradizione passiva, Torino, 2012. ID., La clausola di specialità 
dell'estradizione tra presupposto del processo e condizione del procedere, in Giur. It., 2004, 1145 
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goes no further than that. The judgment recognises, implicitly, that hope is 
an important and constitutive aspect of the human person. Those who 
commit the most abhorrent and egregious of acts and who inflict untold 
suffering upon others, nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and 
carry within themselves the capacity to change. Long and deserved though 
their prison sentences may be, they retain the right to hope that, someday, 
they may have atoned for the wrongs which they have committed. They 
ought not to be deprived entirely of such hope. To deny them the 
experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect of their 




 Overall, it appears that the legal world may have been too quick to laud 
the arrival of the “right to hope.” We are still some way from gaining 
certainty in this area, which was, ironically, the very complaint of the 
Grand Chamber in Vinter. 
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